Abstract
Introduction
In this essay I shall explore the concept o f thinking skills in three different contexts, i.e. Formal Logic (FL), Informal Logic (IL) and Critical Thinking (CT) . In doing so, I shall highlight the historical connections between these disciplines by way o f a narrative.
I could begin my story with the ancient Greeks, or at the Beginning of Everything (en arché en ho logos, John says in John 1:1). However, I shall commence my story at the beginning o f the 20th century. In the final paragraph o f the essay I shall give a short evaluation o f the historical developments which I have narrated.
Before starting off with the narrative, a few remarks on the term thinking skills seem in order here. For the purposes o f my story I shall take this term to mean the following: thinking skills are acquired cognitive operations in the execution o f which a person can attain high levels o f proficiency. Which cognitive operations are relevant in the present context will become clear in the course o f this essay. (However, I do not claim to give a complete list.) The cognitive operations in question are associated with logic, and have been regarded by many philosophers as the 'core skills' o f the Western tradition o f rationality which was initiated by the ancient Greek philosophers.
Formal Logic
In the first decade o f the 20th century a more or less successful marriage was established between mathematics and logic in Whitehead and Russell's Principia M athem atica. At that stage it became possible to give complete definitions o f the logical meaning o f certain so-called logical operators ' (e.g. and, or, if.. then) and to generate conclusive proof of validity for a certain class o f deductively valid inferences from a set of axioms and rules. The semantics and syntax o f the artificial language which mathematical logic uses to construct valid forms o f inference is completely transparent and is not connected in any way to empirical content or psychological processes. For this reason mathematical logic has been acclaimed as an autonomous science which has at long last 21 This interesting option has already been tried out by Hegel (1971:31) .
22 Whether the equation of rationality with 'logicality' is a fundamental mistake, as Toulmin (1972:44) thinks it is, cannot be discussed within the limits of this essay.
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emancipated Logic from Epistemology and Psychology.
The truth table method or alternatively the proof-theoretic method of mathematical logic can be used to test arguments in natural languages (e.g. Afrikaans and English) for validity. In order to do this, arguments in a natural language have to be translated into the artificial language of mathematical logic. The following argument can serve as illustration:
• Argument in natural language:
If it rains it is wet
It rains
Therefore it is wet
• Argument translated into artificial language:
Because mathematical logic is an extremely powerful instrument for the study o f forms o f deductive inference, it has been regarded by many people as the 'last word' on logic. This view has had important implications for the teaching o f thinking skills in logic courses and for the contents o f textbooks on logic. Because mathematical logic is an instrument for the study o f deductive inference, textbooks have tended to emphasize deductive inference and the skills associated with it.
In the context o f m athematical logic 'thinking skills' imply the following:
i) The manipulation o f symbols in accordance with a set o f rules. These rules consist o f a number o f argument forms and statements o f logical equivalence. When applied to a given argument, these rules sanction steps o f deductive reasoning proceeding from the premises to the conclusion o f the argument. Such a completed sequence o f deductive reasoning steps validates the argument.
23 See for instance Scholz (1961:71 -2) .
ii) The translation (or rather transformation) o f sentences in natural language into 'well-formed formulas', i.e. sentences which conform to the rules o f the syntax o f the artificial language.
The new mathematical logic did not completely displace the traditional formal logic, which has derived from Aristotle and has been developed and refined during the Middle Ages and in modem times. This so-called syllogistic or categorical logic is based on the relations between classes of objects.
• The following argument is a typical example o f a syllogism:
All M are P S is M Therefore S is P
• An instance o f this pattern is the following argument:
All human beings are mortal
Socrates is a human being
Therefore Socrates is mortal
This argument is an expression, in syllogistic form, o f a conventional formulation such as 'Socrates, being human, is mortal'.
A certain class o f arguments in conventional argumentative discourse which does not already exhibit a syllogistic form can be expressed in such a form. By applying the rules which govern the valid forms o f the syllogism, it can be ascertained whether a specific argument form is valid or not. There are eleven valid forms o f the syllogism.
In the context o f syllogistic logic the following are important thinking skills:
i) The application o f the rules o f valid syllogistic reasoning by straightforward inspection procedures which enables one to make a definitive decision on whether a specific syllogism is valid or invalid.
ii) The translation o f nonstandard forms o f argument into syllogistic form.
At this stage a glance at the content pages o f two logic textbooks which have been widely used could be useful. One dates from the late 20s and the other from the middle 60s. Excluded from the content summaries below are headings concerning terms, their intention and extension, categorical propositions, and other subjects belonging to the propadeutic o f formal logic. arguments treated by syllogistic logic. The main reason for this state o f affairs is not the power o f tradition (although it certainly does have an effect) but certain limitations o f mathematical logic (to which I will return shortly).
R. Latta
In both books mentioned above deductive reasoning receives priority (and also gets the larger part o f the print). Inductive reasoning is treated as a necessary complement to deductive reasoning because o f the important role it plays in scientific research. Inductive reasoning plays second fiddle to the logic o f deductive reasoning because, unlike the latter, which limits itself to determinate form s o f arguments and (in the case o f mathematical logic) employs a set o f rules which is demonstrably complete, inductive logic is not an 'exact' and 'systematic' discipline. Indeterminate back ground information and methods o f data acquisition affect inductive reasoning. Those are the main reasons why inductive reasoning is often introduced in textbooks under the heading 'The problem o f induction'.
The following main topics are traditionally treated under this heading: induction by enumeration, induction by elimination (Mill's methods) and argument by analogy. The context in which these types o f inductive reasoning are usually treated is 'scientific inquiry' (Welton & Monahan, 1962:337-413; Latta & Macbeath, 1956:299-347) . Textbooks on logic traditionally contain shorter or longer sections on 'informal fallacies' because arguments in natural language may be incorrect not because they have an invalid form but because o f (e.g.) irrelevance or semantic in consistency.
In the context o f inductive reasoning the following 'thinking skills' are o f some importance: the application o f certain criteria in order to determine how strong the support is which the premis(es) give to the conclusion o f a specific argument, and determining the relevance o f the premises in relation to the conclusion o f an argument.
Identification and criticism o f fallacies by using criteria such as relevance 24 This is also the case with Welton and Monahan's Intermediate Logic . A more recent textbook which also contains a section on syllogistic logic is Rafalko's Logic for an Overcast Tuesday (1990) .
and semantic inconsistency may also count as 'thinking skills' in the context o f nondeductive logic.
To summarize: when the standard content o f textbooks on logic is taken into consideration, it may be said that the most important thinking skills taught in mathematical logic are skills o f deductive reasoning. In mathe matical logic such skills consist o f the manipulation o f argument forms and statements o f logical equivalence in order to produce proofs o f validity. Associated with this kind o f deductive reasoning is the trans lation o f statements in natural language into formulae o f the artificial language o f mathematical logic. In syllogistic logic the most important thinking skills consist o f the application o f the rules o f valid syllogistic reasoning to ascertain whether a specific syllogism conforms to the rules (i.e. is valid), and in the transformation o f nonstandard forms o f argument into syllogistic form. As to inductive reasoning, the most important thinking skills consist o f the application o f criteria such as those which determine measure o f support, relevance and semantic consistency. Basic skills which are a prerequisite for the execution o f the complex operations mentioned above, are also taught in standard logic textbooks: these are (inter alia) identification o f arguments in natural language discourse and analysis o f arguments into their basic constituents o f premises and conclusions.
Informal Logic/Logic of natural language
The limitations o f formal logic (syllogistic logic and mathematical logic) which become apparent when it is called upon to handle argumentation in natural language in a comprehensive way, has motivated lecturers, theorists and textbook authors to seek an alternative approach. Since the course relevant to everyday late 60s there is an Informal Logic 'movement' which articulates an important shift in logicians' conception o f 'thinking skills' and the teaching o f such skills to students. This shift can be characterized as a shift away from 'synthetic' arguments which only fill in the variables o f formal logic, and towards authentic argumentative discourse in everyday life (e.g. in politics, religion, court cases, advertisements, popular scientific writing, etc.). One example o f a 'synthetic' argument which is used in a logic exercise may suffice in the present context:
Grandmothers don't go in for surfing. Surfers go in for sunbathing. So sunbathers sometimes aren't grandmothers (Barker, 1985:76) .
The limitations o f formal logic and the thinking skills associated with it become apparent when one tries to construct a logic o f 'everyday' argumentative discourse: * In 'everyday' argumentative discourse most o f the arguments we use do not exhibit valid forms, nor are they meant to. More often than not, when they are valid, their validity does not depend on the logical form they exhibit but on the semantics o f the words and phrases o f the natural language in which they are formulated. 'Everyday' argumentative discourse which is not formally valid can only be made valid by a transformation o f the original discourse, which involves a greater or lesser degree o f distortion. * Translation o f natural language into the artificial language o f mathematical logic is not without problems, and it always remains problematical whether the author o f a specific argument would concur with the interpretation given o f his/her statements in the artificial language. * On the level o f deductive reasoning formal logic has some important limitations. Syllogistic logic is limited to categorical propositions. In the case o f mathematical logic failure to construct a proof of validity cannot be considered sufficient grounds to conclude that the argument in question is invalid. The proof-theoretic method is thus and read about race, pollution, poverty, sex, atomic warfare, the population explosion, and all the other problems faced by the human race in the second half of the twentieth century".
unable to conclusively invalidate an argument; it is only able to definitely validate one. This is the main reason why syllogistic logic has not been completely displaced by mathematical logic: the method o f the former consists in the application o f a few rules in a mechanical manner and it can both validate and invalidate syllogistic arguments. Although the truth table method is a mechanical procedure which can validate or invalidate an argument conclusively, it is too cumbersome to use when an argument form has five or more variables. The proof-theoretic method is for all practical purposes non-mechanical: everybody who has attempted a construction of a complicated argument knows that one proceeds by trial and error and that a great deal o f ingenuity is often called for.
While the formal logic approach focuses on valid forms o f reasoning, the informal logic approach studies the structure o f arguments in documented 'everyday' discourse. Monroe Beardsley's P ractical Logic (1950) set the standard for this type o f analysis by using arrow diagrams to make the structure o f arguments in natural language explicit. The function o f arrow diagrams is to make the connections between the premises and the conclusion o f an argument explicit. For example:
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The encircled numbers stand for statements in a specific passage of argumentative discourse, and the arrows indicate the relation o f support between premises and conclusion. In the example above statements 1 and 2 together support statement 3, which is an intermediate conclusion. Statements 3 and 4 together function as premises which support statement 5, the final conclusion.
In the context o f informal logic the following are important thinking skills: i) Identifying discourse in natural language as argumentative, and isolating the argument from the discourse which does not belong to it (e.g. asides, incidental information, etc.).
ii) Clarifying the meaning o f the discourse (if necessary), i.e. making decisions about vague or obscure language and ambiguous terms with due consideration o f the context of the argument.
iii) Structuring the argument in the standard form and representing the structure by way o f a diagram which makes clear how the premises are connected to each other and to the conclusion.
iv) Supplying tacit premises and conclusions.
v) Employing some technique or other to make the structure o f extended arguments explicit.
The informal logic approach does not only want to make the structure o f arguments in natural language explicit, but also wants to evaluate arguments. In FL the range o f evaluation criteria is (strictly speaking) limited to validity and invalidity. The form o f an argument is either valid or invalid with no degrees in between. In IL it has become standard practice to extend evaluation to the premises o f arguments with questions concerning acceptability and relevance. Acceptability depends on a variety o f criteria, e.g. observation, background knowledge and expertise. Evaluative criteria used in connection with the support rendered by premises to conclusions o f arguments are strong/weak, plausible, cogent etc. In this particular context thinking skills consist o f the following:
vi) The application o f criteria such as relevance and expertise regarding premises, and strength o f support regarding the relation between the premises and the conclusions o f arguments.
Because the majority o f arguments in natural language are not deductive arguments, IL gives priority to inductive reasoning, and also most o f the print. This point can be illustrated by a summary o f the contents pages o f two IL textbooks which may be regarded as representative o f the IL approach:
Inform al L ogic (1986) S.N. Even superficial comparison o f the formal logic approach with the informal logic approach by way o f the contents o f the textbooks summarized above is enough to highlight the implications o f the shift towards reasoning in natural language. The main topics o f the latter concern language and the structure o f short and extended arguments.
However, it is also clear from such a comparison that there is overlap to a certain extent. The formal approach has more often than not sup plemented the study o f logical form with expositions on inductive reasoning and fallacies. The importance o f the latter has generally increased in IL textbooks. Moreover, IL is not as 'informal' as the name suggests. The notion o f validity in IL tends to be intuitive and imprecise to the extent that it is dissociated from the forms o f arguments and made to depend on the meaning or semantic content o f all the words and phrases that appear in the premises and conclusion o f an argument. Validity (or invalidity) in this sense is determined by asking the question: "Supposing the reason(s) were true, is there any way in which the conclusion could be false?" (Thomas, 1986:134) . It is clear that the inability to answer 'yes'
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See Thomas (1986:12) .
to this question does not conclusively validate an argument (for the inability might be due to lack o f imagination on the part o f the person trying to answer the question). Because o f this limitation o f the semantic notion o f validity, and because some arguments in natural language do exhibit valid logical forms, most IL textbooks do treat basic forms o f valid reasoning and some o f the thinking skills associated with the formal approach.
Critical thinking
C ritical Thinking is a term which came into circulation in the USA in the 40s. Sometimes the names Informal Logic and Critical Thinking are used interchangeably for an academic discipline. In my view, however, there are important differences which militate against this usage. In the first place it is a historical fact that there are two 'movements' which exist separately and independently o f each other. The Critical Thinking 'move ment' originated in the early 70s. While IL tends to define itself as an academic discipline and as an enlargement o f the scope o f logic, CT defined itself from the start as an instrument o f educational reform on all levels o f education: leaders in the Critical Thinking movement "have argued that effective and meaningful education requires that curricular, pedagogical and assessment strategies at all levels o f education be coordinated so as to foster in students those cognitive skills and habits associated with critical thinking" (Facione, 1991:1) .
The term thinking skills came into vogue through the Critical Thinking movement. Thinking skills as a generic concept encompasses reasoning skills (which are the main concern o f FL and IL) as a sub-species. Thinking skills is a concept which is wide (and vague) enough to allow inputs from educationists, cognitive psychologists, rhetoricians and communication scientists into the Critical Thinking movement, which has acquired an interdisciplinary character. It is interesting to note that CT has created scope for interaction between Logic and Rhetoric, which have been sworn enemies for centuries.
The Critical Thinking movement has the aim to address three major problems o f the so-called post-modern era (roughly the post-70 industrialized world), i.e. mass education, the information explosion, and the restructuring o f the economy.____________________________________ Mass education in universities and colleges tends to reproduce a style of teaching and learning which can be found in most schools, i.e. the communication o f 'facts' to students, and rote learning and reproduction by the students. One o f the major aims o f the critical thinking movement is to abolish this style o f teaching and learning on all levels o f education by infusing critical thinking skills into the curriculum, into teaching and learning methods, and into assessment.
'Teaching facts', rote learning and reproduction cannot handle the information explosion: what people who are exposed to it need are thinking skills to cope with it. Educating people in the required skills is another major aim of the critical thinking movement.
The restructuring o f the economy, necessitated in industrialized countries by the pressures o f global competition and computer-driven production processes, tends to erase distinctions between 'workers' and 'manage ment'. 'Workers' and 'sta ff are suddenly in need o f a wide range of skills, e.g. decision-making skills, communication skills, planning skills, problem-solving skills, etc. All o f these skills are based on or contain a component o f thinking skills. Educating people to cope with the demands o f a post-industrial economy is the third major aim o f the Critical Thinking movement.
Notwithstanding the differences between CT and IL mentioned above, there is much overlap between them. As I have already mentioned, CT encompasses the reasoning skills mentioned above in the discussion o f IL, and shares with IL its focus on everyday argumentative discourse. CT, however, moves beyond the topics usually associated with IL in that an explicit distinction is made between a 'cognitive skills' dimension and a 'dispositional' dimension to thinking. The latter dimension ties in with CT's educational objectives which are (amongst others) to produce 'good critical thinkers' as opposed to 'weak critical thinkers':
Modeling that critical spirit, awakening and nurturing those attitudes in students, exciting those inclinations and attempting to determine objectively
In 1992 the number of students enrolled in colleges and universities in the USA for the first time equalled the number of pupils attending primary and secondary schools.
if they have become genuinely integrated with the high quality execution of CT skills are ... important instructional goals and legitimate targets for educational assessment (Facione, 1991:20) .
The dispositions or attitudes in question here are (inter alia) openmindedness regarding divergent views, flexibility in considering alternatives and opinions, reasonableness in selecting and applying criteria, and persistence when faced with difficulties (Facione, 1991:25) .
Skills associated with reasoning count as 'core CT skills', but in this context they are viewed as 'micro skills'. Micro skills function within 'macro skills' like listening to or presenting a speech, writing an essay or reading an extended discourse, or even a book. CT tends to emphasize the constructive use o f skills more than IL does. In both FL and IL a tendency exists to use rules and criteria for good reasoning primarily for the evaluation o f discourse; CT tends to place a greater amount o f emphasis on the use o f skills to generate various types o f discourse.
As a post-modern phenomenon CT is eclectic and 'fuzzy' in its composition, as is clear from the subjects in the contents o f two textbooks which may be regarded as representative o f the genre:
Some o f the chapter headings in the table op p. 441 are italicized to highlight construction (as opposed to evaluation) and the assimilation o f topics from various disciplines (communication science, cognitive psychology, rhetoric, and epistemology).
In summary: it is clear from the content lists below that the range of thinking skills treated in IL textbooks (basically reasoning skills) form an important part o f the skills treated in CT textbooks. Because CT is a 'fuzzy' enterprise, there are no 'standard' CT thinking skills. Skills which conceivably fall within the ambit o f 'thinking' (but not 'reasoning') are (inter alia) picking out false implications in advertisements, questioning exaggerated claims and resisting psychological appeals in advertisements, questioning 'bias' or slant in TV and audio news reporting, observation skills, problem solving skills, organizing skills, reporting skills, etc. It is interesting to note that skills associated with evaluating argument forms have been relegated to a few pages in the two books used for illustrative purposes below, and also in Diestler's Becoming a C ritical Thinker (1994 
Conclusion: Evaluation
The historical developments which I have sketched in broad strokes above can be graphically illustrated by an image o f concentric circles:
This image conveys some aspects o f the relations between the contexts in which 'thinking skills' have been elaborated by philosophers and logicians in the 20th century, but it can also be misleading to the extent that it suggests that FL and the skills associated with it forms the core o f IL and CT. This is not the case with regard to CT because valid forms of reasoning tend to receive scant attention in CT textbooks. Concentric circles also give the impression that demarcations between the different disciplines are clear cut. This is not the case especially with regard to IL and CT: therefore their 'boundaries' have been drawn with broken lines. CT is an eclectic affair (it is a moot question whether it is a 'discipline' in the conventional sense) which incorporates bits and pieces from FL, IL and disciplines such as communication science, cognitive psychology and rhetoric. The 'fuzziness' in the composition o f CT has certain advantages because, unlike FL, it can pragmatically annex 'thinking skills' from other 
